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iiSOLVING LINEAR RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODELS
WITH PREDICTABLE STRUCTURAL CHANGES
Adam Cagliarini and Mariano Kulish
1. Introduction
Methods for solving linear stochastic models with rational expectations,
like Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Binder and Pesaran (1995), Uhlig (1995),
Anderson (1997), Klein (2000) and Sims (2002), assume a time-invariant
structure; the parameters that govern the behaviour of the system are taken to be
constant. Although the rational expectations solution has recently been extended
so as to allow some of the parameters to vary in accordance with an exogenous
Markov process with given transition probabilities – see Davig and Leeper (2007)
and Farmer, Waggoner and Zha (2007) – these methods do not handle credible
announcements that entail future variations to the structural parameters.
The situations we have in mind are not merely theoretical curiosities, but rather
real situations of practical importance. Take, for instance, the case of Chile
with respect to announcements regarding inﬂation targets. For example, the ﬁrst
inﬂation target was announced in September 1990 for the 12 months of 1991;
later, in September 1999, the central bank announced a point target for 2000 and
also, starting in 2001, a stationary target range for the indeﬁnite future.1 Other
examples include the announcement of the introduction of the goods and services
tax in Australia in 2000 and the recent announcement by the UK Government to
lower the VAT only to increase it again after 13 months. To the extent that such
announcements are credible, the behaviour of the economy in the period between
the announcement of the policy and its implementation would be poorly captured
using available solution methods.
As emphasised by Marschak (1953), in the case of a foreseen change in structure,
the purely empirical projection of observed past regularities into the future cannot
be used reliably in decision-making. To produce meaningful forecasts, knowledge
of the past structure and of observed past regularities has to be supplemented by
the way the structure is expected to change.
1 See Morand´ e and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000)2
This paper establishes a rational expectations solution for linear stochastic models
in the face of predictable structural variations. The next section reviews the time-
invariant solution of Sims (2002) for linear rational expectations models upon
which we build to develop the solution under anticipated structural variations.
Section 3 states the problem formally and then develops the rational expectations
solution under predictable structural and additive variations. Section 4 illustrates
the solution with a set of numerical examples while Section 5 concludes.
2. The Time-invariant Rational Expectations Solution
The method to solve for equilibria in linear rational expectations (LRE)
models with predictable structural variations builds on the method proposed in
Sims (2002). We begin by introducing notation, then outline the solution in the
time-invariant case and establish key results on existence and uniqueness.
2.1 Deﬁning the LRE Model









where: y1;t, (n1  1), contains exogenous and possibly some endogenous
variables; y2;t, (n21), contains those endogenous variables for which conditional
expectations appear in the LRE model; and zt+1, (k1), contains leads of y2;t so





0 and k = sn2. The dimension of yt is n1, where
n = n1+n2+k.
The LRE model is typically given by n1 +n2 equations relating the elements of
y1;t and y2;t to each other and to IEtzt+1
˜ G0yt = ˜ G1yt 1+ ˜ C+ ˜ Yet (1)
where: et is a l 1 vector that is a random, exogenous and potentially serially
correlated process; ˜ G0 and ˜ G1 are (n1+n2)n matrices; ˜ C is (n1+n2)1; and ˜ Y
is (n1+n2)l.
Since we allow zt+1 to potentially contain more than just one lead of y2;t, we
deviate from the terminology of Sims (2002) and deﬁne the vector of expectations3
revisions as follows
ht = IEtzt  IEt 1zt (2)
where IEtht+j = 0 for j  1. When zt = y2;t, ht becomes a vector of forecast




IEtzt incorporates y2;t and the ﬁrst (s   1) elements of IEtzt+1. So expectation
revisions for y2;t+s do not appear in Equation (2). It is also important to note that
the information set in period t contains the value of all variables up to period t 1
as well as period t shocks.
We augment the system deﬁned by Equation (1) with the k equations from




































which is equivalent, in the notation of Sims (2002), to
G0yt =C+G1yt 1+Yet +Pht (4)
where the matrices G0 and G1 are both nn, while C is n1, Y is nl, and P
is nk. This system contains n equations – the same number as the number of
variables in the state vector, yt. It is worth noting that the vector of expectations
revisions, ht, is determined endogenously as part of the solution.
2.2 Solving the LRE Model









0 = I and both L and W are upper triangular. Q;Z;L and W are,
in general, complex-valued. An important property of this decomposition, which
always exists, is that it returns the generalised eigenvalues of (G0;G1) as the ratios
of the diagonal elements of W and L, fwii=liig.
Pre-multiply Equation (4) by Q to get
Lwt = Wwt 1+Q(C+Yet +Pht) (5)
where wt = Z
0yt. Then rearrange the system so that the explosive eigenvalues















where w2;t is a m1 vector that is associated with the m explosive generalised
eigenvalues and w1;t is (n m)1.























As the lower set of equations is not inﬂuenced by w1;t, the dynamics of w2;t are
isolated as follows
L22w2;t = W22w2;t 1+Q2(C+Yet +Pht) (7)
Let M  W
 1
22 L22 and let x2;t  Q2(C + Yet +Pht). Since the eigenvalues of



















jw2;t+j = 0. Substituting back the deﬁnitions for M and x2;t









Equation (8) relates w2;t to future values of et and ht. This means that knowing w2;t
requires that all future events be known at time t. Taking expectations (conditional









since IEtht+j = 0 for j  1. The fact that the right-hand side of Equation (8) never
deviates from its expected value implies that expectations revisions must ﬂuctuate
as a function of current and future et’s to guarantee that the equality holds.




















The system’s stability depends on the existence of expectations revisions ht to
offset the effect that the fundamental shocks et have on w2;t. To see this, assume





22 Q2(Yet +Pht) (12)
Since this equation has explosiveeigenvalues, stability requires that w2;t =0 for all
t. This means that Q2Yet +Q2Pht = 0 must hold in each period to ensure that the6
effect on w2;t of any fundamental shock (et) is offset by revisions to expectations,
ht; if this condition does not hold, w2;t will behave explosively.
The existence of a stable solution relies on expectations revisions (ht) to adjust so
that the system remains on its stable saddle path (SSP). This means that from any
arbitrary starting point, expectations revisions must be able to get the system onto
its SSP and then keep it there. Proposition 1 states the condition under which this
is possible.
Proposition 1. For any initial starting value y0, a stable solution exists for the
following linear rational expectations system
G0yt =C+G1yt 1+Yet +Pht
if and only if rank(Q2P) = m.
For a proof of Proposition 1, see Appendix A.
Since Q2P is mk, rank(Q2P)  minfm;kg, so the existence of a stable solution
requires that m  k; that is, the number of explosive eigenvalues cannot be larger
than the dimension of ht.
Proposition 1 states the condition for existence with arbitrary initial conditions.
Should the system already be on its SSP, the rank condition is only sufﬁcient for
existence. If initial conditions place the system on its SSP, then the conditions
for existence of a stable solution are weaker. Existence, in this case, requires that
there is a vector of expectations revisions capable of offsetting the effect of new











Regardless of what process et follows, the existence of a rational expectations
solution requires solving a system of the form: Q2Pht = Bt, where Q2P 2 C
mk,
ht 2 IR
k and Bt 2 C
m. The span condition is both necessary and sufﬁcient for the
vector Bt to be expressed as a linear combination of the columns of Q2P and
guarantees that a solution exists for ht.7
The kind of parameter variations that we consider in the next section typically
alter the SSP of the system. Therefore, it is the rank condition that ensures
stability. Announcements about future changes to the structure give rise not only
to changes to the SSP, but also to arbitrary ‘initial conditions’ from the perspective
of the new SSP. Although the span and rank conditions for existence of a stable
solution would typically agree, it is the rank condition which is appropriate if
initial conditions are indeed arbitrary.
Existencedoesnotimplyuniqueness.Ingeneral,itispossiblethatknowingQ2Pht
may not be enough to calculate Q1Pht, which is needed in order to solve for w1;t
and to completely solve the LRE model. This requires that the row space of Q1P
be contained in the row space of Q2P, both of which are subspaces of IR
k. It turns
out that checking the row span condition for the uniqueness of an equilibrium is
equivalent to checking the rank of the matrix Q2P, as the following proposition
states.
Proposition 2. Suppose a solution exists for the following linear rational
expectations system
G0yt =C+G1yt 1+Yet +Pht
then the solution is unique if and only if rank(Q2P) = k.
For a proof of Proposition 2, see Appendix A.
Since rank(Q2P)  minfm;kg, this implies that m  k is a necessary condition
for a unique solution. For arbitrary initial conditions, existence and uniqueness of
a solution requires that m = k.
If a unique solution exists, then there exists a matrix F such that
Q1P = FQ2P (14)



















When such a F exists, the term involving ht drops out. Combining Equations (15)
and (9), it is not difﬁcult to show that the reduced-form of the LRE model becomes













































parameters of the model or anticipated additive shocks. We assume that within
a ﬁnite period of time, the structural parameters of the model converge and no
further shocks are anticipated.
At the beginning of period 1, agents know the previous state of the





t=2, and know how the structural parameters will vary in the future,
f ˜ C1; ˜ G0;1; ˜ G1;1; ˜ Y1;P;fCt;G0;t;G1;t;Ytg
T
t=2;( ¯ C; ¯ G0; ¯ G1; ¯ Y; ¯ P)g. That is, the system
evolves as follows
˜ G0;1y1 = ˜ C1+ ˜ G1;1y0+ ˜ Y1e1 t = 1




t ) 2 t  T




t represents unanticipated shocks to the system and IEte
u
t+j = 0 for j  1.
The reason for identifying these shocks separately is because as time unfolds,9
actual shocks may be different from what were originally expected so that in any
period, we can decompose a shock as the sum of its anticipated and unanticipated




t . We could alternatively include Yte
a
t as part of Ct, but
we identify the shocks separately to illustrate how the solution for predictable
structural variations encompasses anticipated additive shocks as a special case.
Assuming a unique solution exists for t  T +1, the reduced form of the system
can be computed as discussed in the previous section as follows






22 ¯ Q2 ¯ Yet+j t  T +1 (18)
where ¯ M = ¯ W
 1
22 ¯ L22. This solution helps us compute yt for t  T +1, given yT.
The aim of this section is to solve for y1;y2;:::;yT given all anticipated structural
variations and additive shocks.
Since yt is (n1 +n2 +k)1, we require at least T (n1 +n2 +k) independent
equations to obtain a unique solution for fytg
T
t=1. Notice that:
• for each period, we have (n1 +n2) equations as deﬁned by Equation (1). This
gives us T (n1+n2) equations;
• for t = 2;:::;T, rational expectations requires ht = 0. From the perspective of
period t = 1, there should be no forecast errors or revisions to expectations. This
gives us (T  1)k equations; and
• if a stable solution exists for t = T +1 onwards, then ¯ Z
0
2yT = ¯ w2;T, where ¯ w2;T
is given by
¯ w2;T =
 ¯ L22  ¯ W22








22 ¯ Q2 ¯ YeT+j (19)
Equation (19) gives ¯ m equations where ¯ m represents the number of explosive
eigenvalues of the ﬁnal (bar) system. ¯ Z
0
2 is from the QZ decomposition of
(¯ G0; ¯ G1) and therefore has ¯ m independent rows. The last condition is effectively
a terminal condition that guarantees that the system is on its SSP for t  T +1.10











˜ G0;1 0 ::: ::: 0
 G1;2 G0;2
... . . .
0  G1;3 G0;3
... . . .
. . . ... ... ... 0
0 ::: 0  G1;T G0;T













































Theconditionthath2;:::;hT =0impliesthatPht =0fort =2;:::;T.Alsonotice
that the structure of fG0;t;G1;t;Ct;Ytg
T
t=2 guarantees that IEtzt+1 = zt+1 since the
last k rows of Ct and Yt are zero for all t.






0 and A stands for the matrix on the left while b stands for the
vector on the right-hand side of Equation (20). Propositions 1 and 2 imply that for
the ﬁnal (bar) system to have a unique solution, ¯ m = k; in this case, Equation (20)
has as many equations as there are unknowns. However, if the ﬁnal (bar) system
has many solutions, ¯ m < k, then Equation (20) forms a system with less equations
than unknowns, in which case, if there is a solution, there are inﬁnitely many.
Obviously, the existence of a solution to the structurally invariant ﬁnal system is a
necessary condition for Equation (20) to have a solution. We summarise these two
observations with the following propositions.
Proposition 3. Existence of a solution to the ﬁnal (bar) system
¯ G0yt = ¯ C+ ¯ G1yt 1+ ¯ Yet + ¯ Pht
is necessary for the existence of a solution to Equation (20).
Proposition 4. Uniqueness of a solution to the ﬁnal (bar) system
¯ G0yt = ¯ C+ ¯ G1yt 1+ ¯ Yet + ¯ Pht
is necessary for the uniqueness of a solution to Equation (20).11
The propositions above state necessary but not sufﬁcient conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of a solution for fytg
T
t=1. The existence and uniqueness
of a solution for fytg
T
t=1 ultimately depend on the properties of the matrix A. We
have shown that if a unique solution exists for the ﬁnal structure, A is a square
matrix. Next, we argue that A will generally be a full-rank matrix for the following
reasons:
• Therankofthematrix( G1;t G0;t)isnfort =2;:::;T.If not,therearelinearly
dependent and possibly inconsistent equations; a sort of ill-speciﬁed problem.
• The block bi-diagonal structure of the matrix A implies that none of the rows
associated with period t can be obtained as a linear combination of rows
associated with non-adjacent periods. If this is the case, this implies that for
some period, the rank of the matrix ( G1;t G0;t) will be less than n for some t,
violating the preceding point.
• For a well-deﬁned system, the rows of ˜ G0;1 will be linearly independent. So the
ﬁrst n1+n2 rows of A will be linearly independent.
• The rows of ¯ Z
0
2 are linearly independent because ¯ Z is unitary. So the last k rows
of A will be linearly independent.
• In general, no row, for a given period, can be expressed as a linear combination
of the rows associated with that period and from an adjacent period. This would
mean that G1;t and G0;t+1 are rank deﬁcient. Even if this were the case, suppose
for non-zero vectors, w and v, wG1;t = vG0;t+1 = 0, then we would also require
thatwG0;t vG1;t+1 =0iftherewerealineardependencyinrowsassociatedwith
periods t and t +1. Although this is possible, we argue that this seems unlikely.
• The last k rows are linearly independent of the ﬁrst nT  k rows. Clearly, the last
k rows are linearly independent of the rows associated with periods 1;:::;T  1;
for the same reasons we discussed earlier for non-adjacent periods. But, in
general, the last k rows of A are linearly independent of the preceding n rows. If
a linear combination of the rows of ¯ Z
0
2 reproduce a row of G0;T, that same linear
combination of zero vectors must reproduce the corresponding row of  G1;T,
which may not necessarily be zero. ¯ Z
0
2 is typically unrelated to G0;T because it
comes from the QZ decomposition of (¯ G0; ¯ G1). But even if ¯ Z
0
2 came from the QZ
decomposition of (G0;T;G1;T), it relates to G0;T in a non-linear fashion.12
The arguments above imply that the matrix A will be invertible, in which case,
the solution for fytg
T
t=1 will be unique. However, it is possible that A is not
invertible under some perverse parameter variations. Under such circumstances,
the existence of solution requires b to be contained in the column space of the
matrix A; but this is not a guarantee that any such solution will be unique. The
invertibility of A obviously guarantees that there is a unique solution.
This suggests that the way in which parameters vary can determine whether a
unique solution exists or not. For instance, should a policy-maker decide to change
the parameters of the policy rule over a set length of time, it might matter how this
policy change is implemented over time for a unique equilibrium path to exist.
So we conclude that, in general, the existence and uniqueness of a solution for
fytg
T
t=1 will hinge on the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the ﬁnal
structure.
The solution method we propose has a number of advantages: it is simple to
implement as it only requires solving a matrix inversion problem; even in the
absence of structural changes, it enables us to forecast over ﬁnite horizons without
resorting to loops; and it can be used recursively to produce stochastic simulations
in the face of fully predictable structural variations.
4. Numerical Examples
4.1 The Model
We illustrate the solution method outlined above with a series of examples using a
version of the New-Keynesian model presented in Ireland (2007). Unlike Ireland,
we assume, for simplicity, that the gross inﬂation target is a policy-determined
constant, that the deviation of the technology process from its steady state, ˆ zt,
follows a stationary process, and that there are no habits in consumption. Under
these assumptions it is easy to show that the equilibrium obeys the following set
of log-linear equations13
ˆ yt =  s













 yˆ zt +bEtpt+1  ˆ et
 (22)
rt = (1 rr)r+rrrt 1+rp(pt  p
)+ryˆ yt +rgˆ gt +er;t (23)
ˆ gt = ˆ yt   ˆ yt 1 (24)
ˆ at = raˆ at 1+ea;t (25)
ˆ et = reˆ et 1+ee;t (26)
ˆ zt = rzˆ zt 1+ez;t (27)
Equations (21), (22), (23) and (24) are the ‘IS-curve’, Phillips curve, Taylor rule,
and deﬁnition of the growth rate of output, while (25), (26), and (27) govern the
behaviour of the exogenous shock processes to demand, ˆ at, the mark-up, ˆ et, and
technology, ˆ zt. pt is the log gross rate of inﬂation between periods t  1 and t; p

stands for the log of the target rate of inﬂation; ˆ yt = ln(Yt=Y) is the percentage
deviation of output from its steady-state level, Y; ˆ gt is the growth rate of output;
rt = lnRt stands for the log of the gross nominal interest rate between periods t
andt+1; r =p
 lnb is the steady-state level of rt; b is the household’s discount
factor; s is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution; a 2 [0;1]
governs the degree to which price-setting is ‘backward-looking’; the parameters
ra;re and rz all 2 [0;1); and y = (q  1)=f is deﬁned for convenience, where
q is the steady-state elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods and f
controls the magnitude of price adjustment costs. Finally, ea;t, ee;t, er;t and ez;t are
all assumed to be independent and identically distributed (iid) disturbances with
mean zero and standard deviations sa; se; sr, and sz respectively.
While some variables are expressed in percentage deviations from their steady-
state values, others, like pt and rt; are left expressed in log-levels. The only reason
for this is that it aids in the interpretation of the numerical examples that follow
– in particular, those that involve changes in the steady-state values of these same
variables. For example, a change of the inﬂation target alters the steady-state
values of inﬂation and the nominal interest rate.14
Equations (21) to (27), together with the deﬁnitions for the one-period-ahead
forecast errors can be easily put in the form G0yt =C+G1yt 1+Yet +Pht.
We set the model’s parameters to obtain a benchmark calibration for the numerical
examples that follow. The parametrisation (Table 1) is inspired empirically and
in cases borrows values from the literature of similarly estimated models. The
parametrisation itself is, for our purposes, unimportant.
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
p
 Inﬂation target 0.0125
b Household’s discount factor 0.9925
1
s Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.0
a Backward-looking price-setting 0.25
y Elasticity of substitution adjusted for price adjustment costs 0.1
rr Persistence of nominal interest rate 0.65
rp Policy rule inﬂation coefﬁcient 0.5
ry Policy rule output gap coefﬁcient 0.1
rg Policy rule output growth coefﬁcient 0.2
ra Persistence of demand shocks 0.9
sa Standard deviation of demand disturbance 0.02
rz Persistence of technology shocks 0.9
sz Standard deviation of technology disturbance 0.007
re Persistence of mark-up shocks 0.9
se Standard deviation of mark-up disturbance 0.001
sr Standard deviation of monetary disturbance 0.002
4.2 An Increase in rp
We start by considering the impact of announcing a more aggressive policy
towards inﬂation. The announcement refers to the future value of rp. In particular,
the two structures differ only with respect to their value of rp: Both structures,
however, share the same steady state. The initial structure is that of the benchmark
parametrisation, which sets rp to 0.5. The ﬁnal structure sets rp to 1.
The announcement of a different future value for rp has no effect on the evolution
of the non-stochastic steady state; the dynamics are uninteresting if the system
begins and remains at its steady state. To study the implications of an anticipated
structural change we consider a persistent demand shock and assume that the
economy is away from its steady state when this information is known.15
Figure 1 shows impulse responses of output, inﬂation, the nominal interest rate,
and output growth to a one standard deviation demand shock, ea;t: The green
lines show conventional impulse responses given the initial structure: the impulse
responses that would have prevailed in the absence of any known future change
in policy. Similarly, the orange lines show the conventional impulse responses
under the ﬁnal structure: the responses that would have prevailed had the new rule
always been in place. The blue lines show the equilibrium responses of a credible
announcement made in period 4 that in period 8 a new policy that sets rp equal to
1 would be in place.
Figure 1: IRF to a Demand Shock with an Anticipated Future Change in rp































8 4 12 16 8 4 12 16
Period
—  Initial structure     —  Final structure     —  Actual path
Note: The beginning of the shaded region indicates when the announcement is made, the end
of the shaded region indicates when implementation occurs.
For the ﬁrst three periods, the economy behaves according to the initial structure.
At the time of the announcement, inﬂation, output and the interest rate jump to
their new SSP. Because of forward-looking price-setting behaviour, the credible
announcement of a more aggressive policy towards inﬂation in the future serves
to reduce inﬂation relative to the response in the absence of any announcements.
In period 4, annualised inﬂation would have been around 5.7 per cent, but the
announcement has the effect of bringing inﬂation down to 5.5 per cent. In16
period 7, prior to the actual implementation of the new policy rule, inﬂation is
already around 5.2 per cent, close to where inﬂation would have been had the ﬁnal
structure always been in place.
The way the economy evolves between the announcement and the implementation
is essentially a function of the length of the intervening period and
also of the ‘distance’, so to speak, between the initial and ﬁnal reduced
forms. If, for example, the announcement involves a change which is
far into the future, then its contemporaneous impact would be small.
In fact, for the ﬁrst few periods the economy’s response would be
fairly similar to those of the prevailing structure. This is illustrated in
Figure 2 which compares the response of inﬂation in Figure 1 with the one that
would prevail if the new policy is implemented in period 24 (instead of period 8).
Figure 2: Length of Intervening Period – IRF of Inﬂation to a Demand
Shock with an Anticipated Future Change in rp
Announcement in 4, implementation in 8 versus 24
—  Initial structure  —  Final structure















28 24 20 16 12 8 4
Period
Note: The beginning of the shaded region indicates when the announcement is made, the end
of the shaded region indicates when implementation occurs.17
The more the announcement alters the future reduced form of the system, relative
to its present one, the more strongly the economy reacts in the intervening period.
4.3 A Change of the Inﬂation Target
We consider the impact of announcing a lower inﬂation target. The announcement
refers to the future value of p
. As before, we assume that a demand shock hits
the economy in period 1 and that at the beginning of period 4 the central bank
announces that it will implement a lower inﬂation target from period 8 onwards.
In this case, notice that the two structures differ only with respect to the steady-
state value of their nominal quantities. The impulse response functions for output
are invariant to the level of the inﬂation target (Figure 3). However, because of the
presence of nominal rigidities, the announcement has real effects.
Figure 3: IRF to a Demand Shock with an Anticipated Change in p
 from 5
to 2.5 Per Cent Per Annum

























8 4 12 16 8 4 12 16
Period
—  Initial structure     —  Final structure     —  Actual path
Note: The beginning of the shaded region indicates when the announcement is made, the end
of the shaded region indicates when implementation occurs.
As Figure 3 shows, both inﬂation and output fall after the announcement is made.
The central bank conducts policy as governed by the initial policy, however, which18
implies a departure of inﬂation to well below its initial inﬂation target. Although
the central bank cuts the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate increases and
output growth consequently falls.
4.4 Announced Shocks
Figure 4 shows the responses of output, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate to
an announced sequence of monetary policy shocks (as shown in the bottom right
panel).Inperiod2,themonetaryauthorityannouncesthatasequenceofdeviations
from the prevailing rule will occur. In particular, these are expansionary shocks to
thepolicyruleandconsequentlyinﬂationandoutputincreaseintheannouncement
period. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate reach their peaks in period 3 before
the announced shocks take place. Unlike the case with unanticipated shocks, as
these fully anticipated shocks occur, output, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate
are already gradually returning towards their steady-state values.
Figure 4: Response to an Announced Sequence of Policy Shocks
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4.5 A Stochastic Simulation: Announcing a New Monetary Policy Rule
As we have discussed above, the solution method described in Section 3 can be
used recursively to conduct stochastic simulations. The blue lines in Figure 5
show a stochastic simulation with the following characteristics: the benchmark
parametrisation with an inﬂation target of 15 per cent per annum until period 50;
at which time it is announced that in 12 periods time, a lower inﬂation target
of 2 per cent per annum and a more aggressive long-run response to inﬂation
deviations from that the new target will be in place: ¯ rp = ¯ rr = 1. The different
policy rules give rise to different dynamics, as one would expect. It is interesting
to note, however, that the properties of the new regime seem to be inherited shortly
after the announcement is made.
Figure 5: A Stochastic Simulation – Change in the Inﬂation Target from
15 Per Cent to 2 Per Cent, and in rp to 1 and rr to 1
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Note: The beginning of the shaded region indicates when the announcement is made, the end
of the shaded region indicates when implementation occurs.20
5. Conclusions
We have outlined a technique to solve linear rational expectations models in the
faceofanticipatedchangestotheparametersorexogenousvariables.Thissolution
has a number of important applications. Pre-announced changes to a policy rule
can be examined using the techniques discussed in this paper. Variations in the
response of monetary policy to the state of the economy, adjustments to the
monetary policy objectives or anticipated deviations from a policy rule can all be
analysed using the methods outlined in this paper. In more fully speciﬁed models,
one can examine the consequences of shifting from one policy regime (such as
monetary targeting) to another policy regime (inﬂation targeting). Of course, the
method we propose also deals with other anticipated changes to the structure of an
economy.
We have shown that the properties of the ﬁnal structure are crucial for the way
the system behaves between the time agents become aware of a forthcoming event
and the time that the event occurs.
The results have implications for the application of policy rules. For example,
if a policy-maker uses a monetary policy rule that does not satisfy the Taylor
principle, then a unique rational expectations equilibrium typically does not exist.
These rules are considered ‘bad’ as they lead to multiple equilibria. However, if
the policy-maker makes a credible announcement that it will adopt a better rule,
one that satisﬁes the Taylor principle, at some point in the future, then a unique
equilibrium will exist for the economy – regardless of exactly when this will occur
or how bad the policy rule is in the intervening period.
We have assumed that all announcements, for instance, of an impending policy
change, are credible. Further research could extend these techniques to examine
the effect of such announcements when credibility is less than perfect.21
Appendix A: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof
Sufﬁciency: If rank(Q2P) = m, then the columns of Q2P span IR
m. This means
that for arbitrary initial conditions and for any fundamental shock, expectation
revisions can keep the system on its SSP.
Necessity: w2;t must satisfy
L22w2;t = W22w2;t 1+Q2(C+Yet +Pht) (A1)
































Now suppose the initial condition of the system, y0, is arbitrary, so that the
economy may not necessarily be on the SSP. We can then write w2;0 = Z
0
2y0 as











where D0 2 IR
m. We can look at Equation (A1) from the perspective of period 1 to
show that in order for equality to hold (that is, for the system to be on the SSP in22










Since D0 is arbitrary, we require the columns of Q2P to span IR
m. Since Q2P is
mk, this is equivalent to requiring rank(Q2P) = m.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof
Sufﬁciency: Suppose that rank(Q2P) = k, then the rows of Q2P span IR
k.
Therefore, rowspace(Q1P)rowspace(Q2P), since the rows of Q1P necessarily
span some subspace of IR
k.
Necessity: Suppose that the solution is unique. This means that rowspace(Q1P)
rowspace(Q2P).
We know that Q is a full rank nn matrix. Post-multiplying by P extracts the last
k columns of Q. Since Q was full rank, QP must have rank k. If the solution is





should have the same rank as that of Q2P. But since the matrix above is exactly
QP, this implies that the rank of Q2P is k.23
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